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We use bank-level balance sheet data from 2005 to 2010 to study interactions within the
banking system of five emerging countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and
Taiwan. For each country we construct a financial network based on the leverage ratio
dependence between each pair of banks, and find results that are comparable across
countries. Banks present a variety of leverage ratio behaviors. This leverage diversity
produces financial networks that exhibit a modular structure characterized by one large
bank community, some small ones and isolated banks. There exist compact structures
that have synchronized dynamics. Many groups of banks merge together creating a finan-
cial network topology that converges to a unique big cluster at a relatively low leverage
dependence level. Finally, we propose a model that includes corporate and interbank
loans for studying the banking system. This model generates networks similar to the
empirical ones. Moreover, we find that faster-growing banks tend to be more highly
interconnected between them, and this is also observed in empirical data.
Keywords: Leverage dynamics; Banking network; Balance sheet data
1. Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 has stimulated an extensive literature
on numerous credit-related themes such as risk assessment, financial contagion, reg-
ulatory indebtedness or liquidity ratios, misuse of derivatives (see for example [1,
2, 3, 4]). As the crisis unfolded, the understanding of the credit exposure at an
individual bank level, as well as at an aggregate systemic standpoint became in-
creasingly important. A given bank was perceived safer or riskier based not only
on its balance sheet figures or growth estimates, but also on the financial strength
of the insurance companies who would step in in the case of a debtor’s default, the
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financial distress of the peers with whom the bank had more interbank exposure,
liquidity dry-ups which could trigger massive asset fire-sales, or even the assigned
probability to a lender of last resort type of bailout from the central government [5,
6, 7].
Insurance companies played a key function in the network: they had the commit-
ment to enter the scene if a given asset failed to make promptly payments. However
once it became clear that insurance companies would be not be able to compensate
for every risky asset they had insured, it also became apparent that a financial
distress event could propagate across the entire financial system [8]. Banks would
have to start recognizing massive asset losses, and if a bank defaulted, other in-
terconnected institutions could follow, potentially triggering a bankruptcy cascade
[9]. People fearing for its savings could line up and withdraw their deposits causing
a so-called bank run, as was for example observed in the United States, United
Kingdom, Iceland, Spain, or Brazil [6, 10]. This context is pertinent to the present
work, as nowadays much of the discussion continues to be how to define and reg-
ulate higher capital requirements, while at the same time weighting the trade-offs
involved, namely higher costs, or lending shifting to the shadow banking ([23]).a
This paper contributes to this academic discussion by using a network-based
framework to examine the structure and inner dynamics behind the links between
financial institutions in different countries. The application of network theory to
the financial markets [14, 15, 16, 17] gave place to a new set of methodologies to
study interaction in interconnected agents, institutions or financial products (e.g.
portfolios, stock indices, derivatives). However its literature is fairly recent, and to
our knowledge none has studied the banking system structure using actual (non-
simulated) data from banks’ financial statements across several countries. To the
extent that actual interbank data (e.g. loans, repos, swaps) is not publicly available,
we argue that relevant implications can still be derived upon the common behavior
of certain key balance sheet items. As we have learned from the crisis, two banks
can be exposed to each other’s risk, even if there is no financial transaction between
them: if a bank fails, market conditions (liquidity, stock prices, mergers or acqui-
sitions expectations) are all likely to experience cascade consequences. In general,
financial institutions, be them commercial banks, investment banks, development
banks, broker-dealers, or credit unions, fall under the supervision of each country’s
Central Bank. These institutions, henceforth referred to as banks, must usually sub-
mit their quarterly or monthly financial statements to the corresponding Central
Bank regulator.
This article takes advantage of that rich, homogeneous and regular available
information, and uses balance sheet data from 2005 to 2010 from five emerging
aIn December 2010, and as a response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision set out the new Basel 3 Accords, even before Basel 2 or Basel 2.5 had been fully
implemented by many countries [11, 12, 13]. Basel 3 introduced a series of modifications, including
a refined definition of bank capital, additional adjustments to the calculation of risk-weighted
assets, stronger capital ratios and additional liquidity buffers.
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countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan. We then construct
banking functional networks from the leverage dependence across financial institu-
tions, and analyze the structure of this networks. We find configurations that tend
to group into large clusters at relatively low correlation levels. A modular structure
characterized by one large bank community, some small ones and isolated banks is
also found in all countries. In addition, we propose and simulate a model of corpo-
rate and interbank loans that generates rich and diverse balance sheet growth. And
when we construct simulated banking functional networks according to their lever-
age dependence, we find results that are consistent with the empirical networks.
Despite the absence of actual interbank contracts, these findings translate into rele-
vant policy implications in terms of contagion and concentration, as well as suggest
potential avenues for future research.
The paper is divided as follows. Section II describes the data and the methodol-
ogy, Section III describes the main results of the paper, Section IV simulates a model
of interbank loans and compares with empirical data, and Section V concludes.
2. Methods
2.1. Description of the Balance Sheet Data
We study the interaction between financial institutions using balance sheet data
from 2005 to 2010 from five developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South
Africa, and Taiwan. We retrieve total assets and total liabilities for each financial
institution sampled at a monthly or quarterly basis, whichever is more frequent in
its reporting. Let Ak(t) and Lk(t) be the total assets and liabilities, respectively,
for bank k at time t. For each country, the number of banks N , fluctuates in time,
and thus N(t) is a stochastic birth and death process. Throughout the observed
period 2005-2010 the existing banks at 2005 may fall bankrupt, merge with others,
or simply survive until 2010. On the other side, new banks can appear in between,
say in 2006, thus modifying N(t) as well. As the purpose of this work is to study
the interaction between banks, we shall remove from the dataset those banks with
incomplete observations. For example, if a bank stops or starts reporting data in
2007, its observations are removed from that country.
Let N˜ be the banks that satisfy the previous condition, i.e. the effective number
of banks studied. The following table shows both the number of banks in 2005 and
2011 (N(2005) and N(2011)), as well as the number of banks present throughout the
time investigated (N˜). Table 1 also includes the number of banks births (deaths),
Nbirth (Ndeath), during the period 2005-2011. For instance in Brazil 49 banks were
created and 28 disappeared between 2005 and 2011. Only two of these new banks
have gone out of the banking system before 2011. Except for Brazil, the rest of the
countries satisfy the following equation:
N˜ = N(2005)−Ndeath.
We divide the countries into two groups according to their size N˜ , one composed by
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Country N(2005) N(2011) Nbirth Ndeath N˜
Argentina 81 78 3 6 75
Brazil 105 126 49 28 78∗
Mexico 33 40 14 7 26
Taiwan 48 38 8 18 30
South Africa 33 31 0 2 30∗
Table 1. Financial system size of the five countries studied in the period 2005-2011. ∗One bank
from Brazil and one from South Africa were excluded because of missing data in some time periods.
Argentina and Brazil, and the other composed by Mexico, South Africa and Taiwan.
The first group represents a large size banking system with N˜ ≈ 75 and the second
a smaller banking system with N˜ ≈ 30. Also notice the different dynamics between
Brazil (also Mexico) and Taiwan: whereas in the former country the number of
banks increased over time, in the latter decreased. By contrast, Argentina and
South Africa exhibit very small fluctuations in N(t) for the period studied.
2.2. Network construction
The construction of a network of associations out of balance sheet variables requires
selecting an interaction metric that meets two general properties. First, it should be
robust to spurious correlations so that we avoid as much as possible to use a non-
stationary variable that may increase or decrease simply following a global trend.
And second, it should be relevant to describe an economic process. In other words, if
two banks are associated with a given variable, it should mean that they are subject
to certain equivalent market or economic conditions, and therefore may share the
same risk. We argue that balance sheet aggregates such as assets are inappropriate
to define a network, and instead propose to use the leverage ratio.
Consider for instance total assets, which are regarded as a proxy of bank size,
and are subject to a large number of global or macroeconomic circumstances. Un-
der normal market conditions, the assets of a financial institution are expected
to grow with time, as a result of general growth of the economy, inflation, bal-
ance sheet effects from expansionary monetary policy, population (customer base)
growth, increased access to banking services (banking penetration), higher value of
the securities held by the bank (stocks or debt). It seems that almost any pair of
banks, regardless whether they are contractually linked or not, will yield a positive
assets’ correlation, and thus will incorrectly suggest an overlinked network.
We instead propose using the degree of indebtedness, henceforth referred to as
the leverage ratio, as the metric on which to base the interactions. We define the
leverage as follows
Leverage =
Liabilities
Equity
Where liabilities and equity refer to the balance sheet variables of a given bank
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Fig. 1. Two examples of the evolution of a bank’s leverage. Increase (A) and decrease (B) of the
leverage ratio.
which must satisfy the usual accounting identity: Assets = Liabilities+Equity, and
as measured at book value. Therefore, the leverage ratio of bank k, Leveragek =
Lk
Ak−Lk , indicates what fraction of equity and debt this bank is using to finance its
assets.b
Consider for instance Panel (A) and Panel (B) of Fig. 1, which shows an example
where the leverage increases and decreases, respectively. The former may happen,
for instance, through a credit quality shock, such that the value of the existing
claims decreases and the bank increases its loan loss provision. Such loan write-offs
translate into a reduction in total equity, thus increasing the ratio. The leverage can
also rise if, for example, the bank simply issues debt to finance a potential acquisition
or expand its credit portfolio. What regards to Panel (B), a bank may deleverage by
prepaying debt with its own cash, where both total assets and liabilities decrease.
It is also possible for the shareholders to conduct a capital increase, with proceeds
either paying down debt or cushioning its assets. These examples illustrate only
a few of the many different scenarios why a leverage ratio may fluctuate within a
given financial institution.
bThis ratio distinguishes from the capital ratio in that the capital of a bank is composed by common
equity (less goodwill) as well as Tier 1/2 components such as hybrid securities, convertible capital
instruments, preferred stock, provisions, loan loss reserves, and other adjustments. This definition
also varies from country to country.
August 21, 2018 3:36 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
banking˙networks˙arxiv˙resubmission
6 D. Aparicio and D. Fraiman
Finally, to address the stationary concern Fig. 2 depicts the median (results
remain unchanged with the average) leverage ratio for each country as a function of
time. Contrary to what happens with liabilities and assets (Fig. A.1), the leverage
ratio does not exhibit any strong time dependence. Each country exhibits its own
leverage range, with more or less fluctuations over time. Taiwan, for example, is
characterized by exhibiting a large median leverage ratio (∼ 16) while Argentina
and Brazil exhibit a lower ratio (∼ 6).c
Leverage levels across countries are expected to differ due to different bank capi-
tal regulation. Each country may impose its own restrictions on hedging operations,
ability to buy or sell foreign currency, place debt in the national or international
markets (and at which currency), banks may be subject to a particular govern-
ment program (e.g. subsidized mortgage or consumer credit programs with prede-
termined interest rates), restrictions on dividend distribution. The Central Bank
may also have in place a monetary and/or inflation target rate, which in turn mod-
ifies the reference rate at which banks lend each other and hence the rates at which
households or corporates access to credit. Countries also differ in their accounting
consolidation practices or taxation. Overall these factors limit the construction of
leverage-based networks at the country level, as opposed to aggregated inter-country
networks.
In particular, we construct country-level networks of leverage dependence as
follows.
1. Compute the leverage time series for all banks from 2005 to 2010 in a given
country. After accounting for mergers and acquisitions, banks with incomplete
data points are excluded (either because they appeared later or disappeared
sooner than the 2005-2010 range).
2. Compute the leverage correlation matrix between all pairs of banks.
3. Establish links between banks (nodes) whenever the correlation exceeds a given
threshold ρ. The structure of the network is studied for different values of ρ.
Finally, notice that the leverage ratio also presents the important advantage
of not depending on the currency, thus allowing us to use the same variable across
countries. Furthermore, any difference in regulation or local practice of an improved
indebtedness ratio (e.g. capital ratio after Tier 1 / 2 adjustments) is neutral within
a country (for it applies to all) and not relevant across countries, since this paper
does not compare absolute leverage levels, but rather the interaction that can be
derived from common leverage behaviors.
cAs fas as we investigated, the size of the banking system is not related to the average leverage
ratio.
August 21, 2018 3:36 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
banking˙networks˙arxiv˙resubmission
Banking Networks and Leverage Dependence 7
2005 2007 2009 2011
Time
0
5
10
15
20
Le
ve
ra
ge
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
South Africa
Taiwan
Fig. 2. Stationary behavior of the leverage ratio. Median leverage as a function of time. Each
color corresponds to a country. Similar results are obtained using the mean as measure of central
tendency. The overall-time median leverage is 16.4 for Taiwan, 11.3 for Mexico, 9.7 for South
Africa, 6.0 for Argentina, and 5.5 for Brazil.
3. Results
We next illustrate an example using data from the Argentine banking system. Given
two time series, corresponding to the leverage evolution of two banks, x(t) and y(t)
with t = {1, 2, . . . , T}, we compute the Pearson correlation coefficient. Where this
coefficient takes value r ∈ [ -1, 1] , and is equal to 1 when the two time series are
identical (x(t) = y(t) for all t).
The correlation matrix is composed by the N˜(N˜−1)/2 pairs of banks correlation
coefficients (interactions). Figure 3 (A) shows the leverage ratio evolution for six
(from a total of 75) different Argentine banks. Three colors are used to illustrate
the different behaviors observed throughout the sample. For example the middle
(bottom) two leverage curves in blue (green) correspond to two banks that exhibit
an increasing (decreasing) leverage evolution. Another type of leverage evolution
is shown in red, with a concave-shaped leverage behavior. The dynamics of the
Argentine banking system is found to be very rich from an indebtedness perspective.
As we shall see later, these rich dynamics lead to a complex banking network.
It also follows that banks C and D have a similar leverage increasing pattern. The
same is found between banks E and F with practically a scale factor of difference
between them, and to banks A and B, although with a different type of evolution.
Each of these pairs of banks exhibit a large correlation coefficient between its cor-
responding leverage time series, e.g. r = 0.81, 0.84, and 0.83 for the pair of banks
A-B, C-D, and E-F respectively. However, if we compute the leverage correlation
between bank C (or D) and E (or F) this value will be negative, thus stating that
the two banks exhibit an opposite behavior. In this last case the four correlation
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Fig. 3. Banks’ leverage dynamics . Upper, middle, and lower panels show characteristics leverage
curves from different banks in Argentina. The correlation between the two curves in each panel is
shown on the right. Note that there are cases of negative correlation, e.g. between the red curves
of the middle and low panel is -0.9 and between black curves is -0.86.
coefficients range between -0.35 (for C-E) and -0.65 (D-E). The remaining possible
interactions between the six banks fluctuate around zero.
The complete characterization of interdependence between the 75 Argentine
banks is captured by the correlation matrix in Panel B, with each column and
row representing a bank. A special algorithm is used to order the banks for a better
visualization, such that light yellow “spots” correspond to group of banks that share
a similar behavior among them (large r coefficient), while negative correlations are
represented in dark red color.
Although the leverage dependence does not imply an interbank transaction (e.g.
as would be a repo agreement), a strong and recurring synchronization is still rel-
evant in the understanding of concentration and systemic risk. It is reasonable to
think that a highly leveraged network where many banks are simultaneously lever-
aged does not imply the same contagion risk as does a network where only a small
set of banks are moderately leveraged. We can also think of the degree of negative
and positive correlations as another determinant of how robust the banking system
is. In this sense, identifying and studying which banks form clusters that tend to
leverage (deleverage) all together can also provide useful policy implications at a
time where stricter banking regulation is at the core of the debate ([23]).
Interestingly, from a risk-sharing point of view, it would be optimal for the finan-
cial institutions not to share identical leverage dynamics, such that a shock affecting
the indebtedness of a given bank is not be followed by its peers. For a banking sys-
tem to remain healthy and resilient to financial contagion, its dynamics needs to
be heterogeneous. That is, greater heterogeneity helps to isolate individual shocks
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by setting a less interconnected financial system. Further, this can be understood
as the system’s endogenous solution to reduce its risk from financial shocks.
Notice that the economic implications behind the positive and negative depen-
dence scenarios are quite different. A positive correlation between two banks implies
that they both increase and decrease their debt-to-equity ratio simultaneously. In
this case, we would expect both banks to share (or target) similar growing. Alter-
natively, banks’ balance sheets could be affected by exogenous policies along the
theories of balance sheet effects ([18, 19, 20]), bank lending channels ([21, 22]), and
bank runs ([30, 31, 32]).
On the other hand, a negative correlation implies that when one bank increases
its leverage, the opposite is true for the other bank, and vice versa. A potential
explanation for this case is related to the literature of fly-to-safety, i.e. in periods
of financial turmoil households withdraw their deposits from a small bank and
transfer them to a bigger (perceived as safer) institution. Thus liabilities decrease
in the small bank, but increase in the other bank, resulting in a negative leverage
correlation between them. As documented in [24], this effect was observed in Brazil
in late 2008, where depositors ran from smaller banks to larger banks, the latter ones
perceived as too-big-to-fail institutions with implicit guarantees from the Central
Bank.
An alternative mechanism comes from what the literature calls the depositors
discipline: depositors may punish banks with poor performance either by demand-
ing higher interest rates or by withdrawing their deposits. [25] find evidence in
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico of the depositors discipline mechanism, in particular
that bank deposits growth falls as risk exposure increases. Also [26, 27] and [28] doc-
ument that depositors favor big banks, although it is hard to differentiate whether
depositors base their decisions on too-big-to-fail sentiments or bank fundamentals.
Also, [29] report that during the 2001 Argentine convertibility crisis deposit with-
drawals were more pronounced in banks with higher risk taking, thus providing
further evidence of opposite changes in balance sheet accounts across banks.
We now characterize the complete Argentine network. The upper panel of Fig.
4 depicts the graphical representation of the Argentine financial network with M
links, or with an average degree 〈k〉 equal to 2M/N˜ . Recall that each node rep-
resents a bank, and the M highest banks’ pair correlations are connected by an
undirected edge. Put alternatively, an edge (or link) between two nodes (or ver-
tices) is added whenever its leverage pair correlation exceeds a certain threshold
value ρ. The same banks showed in Fig. 3 are highlighted in the network repre-
sentation of Fig. 4. Fig. 4 shows clusters of banks, where a cluster is defined as a
community of interconnected (linked) banks. And each color represents a different
leverage (temporal) dependence. In particular, the network can be characterized
by four homogeneous groups: a large cluster of banks that essentially have an in-
creasing leverage evolution (e.g. banks C and D); three small groups with various
leverage behaviors (decreasing, concave-shaped, and a mixed of both); and finally
a large set of isolated nodes (41 from 75), represented with white circles.
August 21, 2018 3:36 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE
banking˙networks˙arxiv˙resubmission
10 D. Aparicio and D. Fraiman
Fig. 4. Banks’ leverage network for two large size banking systems. Upper (lower) panel corre-
sponds to Argentina (Brazil). In both countries 〈k〉 = 2.5.
Interestingly, we also find that the modular structure observed in the Argentine
banking system is similar to other countries. Despite having different size, regula-
tion, or even average indebtedness level, the leverage dynamics are consistent across
countries. Bottom panel of Fig. 4 shows the Brazilian banking network using the
same methodology as well as the same 〈k〉 = 2.5 used in Argentina. It can be
observed that Brazil’ s network is similar to Argentina’s, namely both are charac-
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terized by a large community of banks, another set of small clusters of banks, and
many isolated banks.
As the correlation threshold decreases (and the number of links M increases),
both the isolated and the small-cluster nodes start merging into one large inter-
connected cluster. This merger-type of behavior between different groups can be
observed in Fig. 5, where the fraction of nodes that belongs to the largest cluster
(blue nodes as per Fig. 4) is shown as a function of the correlation threshold. As
we lower the threshold ρ, the largest cluster starts absorbing smaller communities.
Big jumps in this graph indicate that two large clusters have merged. For example,
in Brazil’s case a small change in the correlation threshold around 0.6 causes the
two largest clusters (each one representing approximately 40% of the nodes) to be
either merged or divided. In Argentina this similar and sudden concentration occurs
at a greater correlation threshold (ρ = 0.75). We also find that in both countries
90% of the banks belong to a unique cluster at a relatively small correlation thresh-
old ρ = 0.5, thus suggesting that the financial networks may become suddenly too
concentrated.
Finally, we replicate the analysis to the smaller banking systems of Mexico,
South Africa and Taiwan. Fig. 6 (A) shows the leverage-based networks of these
countries for an equal number of links per node, i.e. for 〈k〉 = 2.5. Similar network
properties are observed across these countries. In particular, although Taiwan’s
banking system is more volatile (large fluctuations in N(t)), the banking network
structure is very similar to the South African one, and both have almost the same
total number of banks (N˜ = 30). This result is strengthen by the similar relationship
between the size of the largest cluster and the correlation threshold shown in panel
B.
The Mexican network, on the contrary, seems to exhibit certain differences with
respect to the other two. For ρ = 0.5 the largest cluster does not have significant
weight (right bottom panel), as it only accounts for 30% of the total nodes in the
network. As the correlation threshold decreases, a second cluster grows until is
finally merged with the largest one (left bottom panel). Thus we observe that the
consolidation of the Mexican banking network is characterized by the merger of two
large clusters, whereas in the other countries there is only one large cluster which
then absorbs either individual nodes or very small clusters.
In summary, our proposed method to examine the banking system from a lever-
age perspective yields networks composed by a large group of banks that are densely
interconnected (blue cluster in Fig. 4 and 6), a few smaller clusters, and many
isolated banks. Interestingly, this topology is homogeneous across countries, as de-
picted in Fig. 4 and 6. As the interaction criterion becomes more and more lax
(smaller ρ, in absolute value), banks start re-grouping into a unique financial clus-
ter. Furthermore, the network structure is not dominated by one hub, as it occurs
with many nature networks ([33, 34]). On the contrary, these banking networks
exhibit a modular structure where each module is densely connected. Only a few
banks function as bridges, or connectors between different modules.
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Fig. 5. Size of the largest cluster. Proportion of banks that belongs to the largest cluster as a
function of the correlation threshold.
The existing structure also suggests a somewhat fragile property: a small mod-
ification to these connector banks can have sensible effects to the configuration of
clusters, as well as to the isolation or propagation of a shock across the network. On
the one hand, highly interconnected banks (hubs) are not desirable, since a failure
in a hub can be spread out the network, potentially causing an aggregate system
breakdown. But on the other hand, some degree of interconnectedness is positive,
as it helps to reduce the exposure of an affected node by sharing and loading off risk
with its peers. Therefore we argue that the existence of dense network structures
may be desirable to some extent in order to increase risk sharing and reduce hub
exposure. In this sense, in order to reduce risk and increase shock resilience, reg-
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Fig. 6. Banks’ leverage network for three small size banking systems, and the size of the largest
cluster. (A) Mexico’, Taiwan’, and South Africa’s networks. (B) Proportion of banks that belongs
to the largest cluster as a function of the correlation threshold. (C) Mexican network at two
different correlation thresholds, as indicated by the two green arrows in the upper panel.
ulators should recognize a basic trade-off: as connectivity and clustering increases,
individual (idiosyncratic) risk may decrease due to better risk sharing, but global
or systemic risk could increase thanks to faster channels of propagation. The degree
of optimal bank connectivity, and how can it be reached, are still active questions
in the literature.
4. A Model of Corporate and Interbank Loans
4.1. Description
In this section we intend to contrast the empirical results from Section 3 with simu-
lations from a model of corporate and interbank loans. We first start by describing
the set up of the model. We propose that the corporate sector requests loans from
the banking system according to a given random process, and links between banks
arise due to insufficient liquidity to meet these loans. This lending effect gener-
ates rich balance sheet and leverage dynamics that yield networks that are overall
consistent with the empirical results.
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Our model builds on the interbank model proposed in [38]. For simplicity we
assume perfect information in the economy, although as explained by [39] imperfect
information can result in an additional source of financial risk. Further, although we
think of agents in the real sector as the implicit source of interbank links, the model
does not generate balance sheet dynamics from the agents’ side of the economy. See
[40] for an example of an agent-based interbank network model. See also [41] for a
review of ACE (agent-based computational economics) modeling in economics.
The model is structured as follows.
1. The banking system is composed by N banks. Assets are defined as the sum of
liquidity L, iliquid assets I, corporate loans C, and interbank loans BL. Liabil-
ities are defined as the sum of deposits D and interbank debt BD. Moreover,
any bank i at time t must satisfy:
Assets = Liabilities+ Equity
Lit + I
i
t + C
i
t +B
L,i
t = D
i
t +B
D,i
t + E
i
t
2. Let assets Ai1 at time t = 1 be drawn from a uniform distribution, e.g. from 5,000
to 50,000. Then for each bank set a conservative equity-to-assets ratio selected
at random from the interval 0.10 to 0.35. And finally, let liquidity Li1 at t = 0
be a fixed share of assets, thus featuring that a given bank can be solvent to
provide loans or take additional debt, but still illiquid to do so. These steps so
far are sufficient to characterize the banking system at the initial period.
3. Next assume the corporate sector requests loans from the banking system ac-
cording to a Poisson process of rate λ, i.e. the length of time between loan
requests is exponentially distributed. Let ` be the fixed amount of the loan, and
rC be the interest rate of these loans. Each loan is supplied by only one bank i,
where i is chosen at random with equal probability among the N banks. How-
ever, if bank i is selected and Lit−1 < `, it lacks enough liquid assets to fulfill
the entire loan. To cover the difference, bank i enters into the interbank market
and borrows at rate rB (with rC > rB) from bank j, where j is also selected
randomly across the N − 1 remaining banks.
4. Similarly, if Ljt−1 < `− Lit−1 then bank j cannot supply the interbank loan. If
this occurs then a new bank is chosen from the remaining N − 2 banks.
5. As soon as ` is supplied to the corporate sector, liquidity Lmt as well as household
deposits Dmt increase in a subset of banks m ∈M by the amount ωmt ×`, where
ωm are random weights such that
∑
m ω
m
t = 1, and M < N . The intuition
is that the corporate sector distributes the loan in the economy, for example
in the form of wages, and households in turn deposit these proceeds randomly
across a small number of banks. Notice that this generates balance sheet (assets)
growth, which will further enrich the leverage dynamics. Although the M banks
are drawn randomly each time a loan takes place, i’s weights are fixed but re-
scaled, i.e. ωmt = ω
m/
∑
m′ ω
m′ ∀t,∀m,m′ ∈ M ⊂ N . The rationale is that
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some banks tend to have a higher (or lower) share of deposits that is stable
over time.
6. In addition, we propose that in each period there is a (low) probability of a
negative shock to a random bank i. When the shock event is triggered, deposits
and liquidity decrease in fixed amount, e.g. 0.2× `.d
7. Finally, the corporate and interbank loans are paid back after T periods. There-
fore at time t+T bank equity Eit+T will increase by the net amount of interest
earned between the loan granted to the corporate sector and, if any, the funds
borrowed from the interbank market. Contrary to the loan being initially dis-
tributed across the banking system, the funds for repayment come exogenously
from the real sector. In other words, we implicitly assume the corporate sector
is always productive and therefore is able to generate proceeds elsewhere.
Notice that the complete set of bank interactions resulting from the model can
be described in the form of a directed network. In this graph nodes are given by
the N banks, and the directed links between nodes are given by the direction of
the interbank loan. Therefore each point in time can be fully characterized by an
adjacency matrix At, where At is a N × N matrix and in general will not be
symmetric. An entry Ai,j = 1 (i.e. edge from i to j) implies bank j has borrowed
from bank i. However, we will not use this information for analyzing the data, we
will only apply the methodology described before for the simulated Leverage time
series to study the generated functional networks.
4.2. Simulation Results
We now simulate the model settingN = 80 to be comparable to the actual size of the
Argentine and Brazil network. This allows, without loss of generality, to more easily
contrast the results with those in Section 3. In fact, results remain qualitatively
similar if we modify parameters such as N , `, rC , rB , etc. For instance, consider
Panel (A) and (B) of Fig. 7 which show the simulated dynamics of average assets
and leverage over time, respectively. After some transient period (not shown) the
average leverage become stationary (Panel (B)). Moreover, the stationary value is
6 which is very similar to the value observed in Argentina and Brazil (see Fig. 2).
The average assets grows over time (Panel (A)), obtaining a growth of 4.5 for the
time period studied. This last value is compatible to the Brazil assets growth (Fig.
A1). Now, that the average assets and leverage are similar to the empirical one, we
study the individual bank behavior applying the network methodology described
before for the individual simulated leverage time series.
Panel (C) in Fig. 7 shows the graphical representation of the simulated leverage
network for a correlation threshold ρ = 0.8. The topology is very similar to the net-
work in Fig. 4. In particular, the network is characterized by a large interconnected
dThis type of liquidity-related credit shock is somewhat different from those in [42] or [16] since
we are more interested in simulating lending dynamics rather than solvency or default risk per se.
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Fig. 7. Results for the simulated model with N = 80 and 5,000 periods. (A) Banks’ assets growth.
(B) Average leverage over time. (C) Representation of simulated network. (D) Proportion of banks
that belongs to the largest cluster as a function of the correlation threshold.
cluster, together with smaller communities of banks, and many isolated banks. Fur-
thermore, not only banks tend to merge with the largest cluster as ρ decreases, but
also it presents the discontinuity property that leads to a unique large cluster (Fig.
7 (D)). The proportion of nodes that belongs to the largest cluster jumps from 0.4
to over 0.8 at around ρ = 0.5. The result shown in Panel (D) is very similar to that
obtained in Fig. 5.
Therefore the interbank model generates modular structures that resemble the
empirical networks. But can we say more about the mechanisms that drive the links
between banks? In particular, we want to know whether the model can shed light on
the dynamics behind the leverage dependence. In order to answer this we propose to
study two banks, and in particular, the two most correlated banks. To avoid drawing
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conclusions from one simulation, we instead simulate the model 40 times, and for
each of them we identify the two banks with the largest leverage dependence. Then
compute the total leverage and assets growth, that is, the growth between the last
period t = 5, 000 and t = 0. We compute this ratio for both banks in each of the 40
replications.
The histogram of these ratios is depicted in panels (A) and (B) of Fig. 8. Inter-
estingly, we find that the two banks exhibit large growth in both variables. In the
model this takes place when banks receive greater frequency of loan requests. And
at the same time, since these banks tend to have sufficient liquidity, they are also
more likely to lend to other banks. The model therefore suggests that banks with
more aggressive growth strategies may be more interconnected, and hence share
additional risks between them.
We then translate this measure to the analog of the empirical samples. In Panels
(C) and (D) of Fig. 8 we compute the leverage and the total assets growth for each
bank in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. Where banks are ordered for better
visualization. Recall we are comparing the simulations against Argentina and Brazil
because they share a similar size N = 80. Red and green dots identify the two most
correlated banks in each country. Notice that both banks indeed exhibit a higher
leverage growth. A higher assets growth is also found in Argentina, and to a less
extent in Brazil’s network.
5. Conclusion
After the recent and still ongoing financial crisis an important bulk of research
has turned its eyes into new ways to model financial risk and contagion between
financial institutions, and how to improve regulation so as to reduce risk at both the
individual and aggregate level. At the time of writing, banking supervision codes
are being modified in order to incorporate tighter capital and liquidity requirements
such that financial institutions are much better prepared to absorb losses in future
credit-related events.e This is particularly important since a crisis starting at a given
place can very easily amplify or spread across the system through various channels:
counterparty risk due to interbank lending, generalized fall in asset prices (fire sales
to boost capital/margin requirements), liquidity hoarding or funding constraints
(higher margins, run on repo/money market), self-fulfilling prophecies (bank runs),
non-government bailout, or underestimation of risk in, and exposure to, derivate
securities.
This paper studies the banking system within five different countries, and then
compares the results across them. We construct networks using bank-level balance
sheet data, where links between each pair of banks are assigned upon the leverage
ratio dependence. Although this interaction does not imply an interbank financial
transaction, our findings do illustrate that recurring leverage dynamics (e.g. cluster
eFor an overview of the banking supervision regulation, see for example [35, 36, 37].
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Fig. 8. Leverage and assets growth for the simulated and actual networks. (A) and (B) Leverage
and assets growth for the two most correlated banks, B1 and B2. (C) and (D) Leverage and assets
growth in Argentina’ and Brazil’s networks.
of banks that simultaneously leverage or deleverage) is relevant in the understanding
of risk concentration.
Interestingly, we find that in all countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South
Africa, and Taiwan) the network topology is characterized by a large cluster of
interconnected banks, together with other small communities and isolated banks.
As the correlation threshold gets lower, the proportion of banks that belongs to
the largest cluster increases almost dramatically: in both Argentina and Brazil, for
instance, 90% of the banks group into a unique cluster at a 0.5 threshold. We also
find that these networks are not dominated by a hub (extremely interconnected
node), but by a modular structure where communities are connected by bridge
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banks. This novel finding can be thought of as an optimal strategy to diversify
risk within a group of banks that share similar characteristics. In other words, this
subset restricts the spread of a distress cascade when one bank fails, as well as limits
ex-post government assistance to a reduced set of banks.
To test the robustness of our results we present a model of corporate and inter-
bank loans. The model generates rich balance sheet and lending dynamics, which
certainly do not intend to capture all the intricacies between the financial system
and the rest of the economy. Our objective is much smaller, and is to generate
lending dynamics that can shed light on the complexity of interbank relationships.
Interestingly, in doing so we obtain leverage networks that closely follow the empir-
ical ones. Our simulations also suggest that banks with recent rapid or aggressive
growth strategies are more likely to be interconnected, and hence share more risks.
Understanding risk and leverage using a network framework can also be of in-
terest to policymakers and regulators, who for instance can build upon these tools
to locate heavily interconnected banks and evaluate its importance to the aggre-
gate system. When credit events occur, the indebtedness ratio is often the most
straightforward and commonly used proxy to assess sustainability. Policymakers
should enrich this analysis by incorporating additional indicators of direct exposure
such as interbank loans or repo agreements, which can also be used to construct
more detailed networks.
Finally, understanding how individual or common shocks trigger financial crises
is not only necessary to design countercyclical or containment policies, but also to
design policies that prevent or limit the surge of such crises in the first place. As
suggested in [42], [43] and [44], institutions that are more likely to destabilize the
system could be subject to stricter supervision, higher capital requirements or lower
interbank exposure. This situation would certainly reduce moral hazard incentives
for excessive risk-taking at institutions that are too large to be risked to fail. The
G-20, the Financial Stability Oversight Committee and several countries on their
own are already in the process of drafting special supervision guidelines for these
so-called “systematically important financial institutions” or SIFIs ([45] and [46]).
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Supplementary data
Figure A 1. Banks’ assets over time. Total assets as a function of time for Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan. For each country total assets was normalized by its value in
2005.
